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Los Angeles Lawyer

The Magazine of the Los Angeles County Bar Association


February 2013     Vol. 35, No. 11


 

MCLE Article: Class Control

After a recent Ninth Circuit decision, plaintiffs may elect to pursue more single-state class actions.

By Eric Y. Kizirian and Michael K. Grimaldi

Eric Y. Kizirian is the vice chair of the Class Action and Mass Tort practice group at Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP. He specializes in class actions and represented Honda in Mazza. Michael K. Grimaldi is a litigation associate at Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP in the Class Action and Mass Tort practice group.


 
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In Mazza v. American Honda Motor Company,1 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held, for the first time, that the application of California's consumer protection laws to all class members in a nationwide class was inappropriate under California's choice-of-law rules and that the law of the state where the transaction took place should govern. This holding drew criticism from dissenting Judge Dorothy Nelson, who predicted the majority's decision would prove "devastating to consumers."2 Some practitioners have opined that Mazza makes it nearly impossible to certify a nationwide class that would apply California's consumer protection laws nationwide. Others have predicted an end to nationwide class actions. Mazza is already having a profound effect on the certification and pleading stages of federal class actions in California.

The plaintiffs in Mazza filed a class action against Honda alleging that Honda had misrepresented the capabilities of an optional safety feature and concealed material information regarding the feature in advertisements. The plaintiffs brought claims under California's consumer protection statutes, alleging unjust enrichment and violations of the California Unfair Competition Law, the False Advertising Law, and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act.

The district court certified a nationwide state-law class under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit granted Honda's request to review the district court's order under FRCP 23(f). In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth Circuit panel vacated the district court's class certification because the district court "erroneously concluded that California law could be applied to the entire nationwide class."3 In the process, the court provided an in-depth choice-of-law analysis of all three steps of California's governmental-interest test and, for the first time, articulated pro-business considerations and policies that should be considered when applying this choice-of-law test.

At the outset, the Ninth Circuit noted the basic principle that a federal court sitting in diversity must look to the forum state's choice-of-law rules to determine the controlling substantive law. Under California's choice-of-law rules, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing that California has significant contact or aggregation of contacts to the claims of each class member. The court found that the plaintiffs met this burden because Honda's corporate headquarters, the advertising agency that produced the alleged misrepresentations, and a fifth of the proposed class were located in California.

However, writing for the majority, Judge Ronald Gould found that the district court misapplied California's choice-of-law rules by allowing California's substantive laws to apply to the entirety of a class that hailed from 44 different states. According to the court, California law may be applied nationwide only if the interests of other states are not found to outweigh California's interest in having its law applied. To determine what law applies to non-California plaintiffs suing in California courts, the courts use the three-step governmental-interest test.

First, the court determines whether the relevant laws of the potentially affected states are different. Second, if there is a difference, the court determines if there is a "true conflict" by examining each state's interest in applying its own law to the case. Third, if a true conflict exists, the court determines which state would be more impaired if its law was not applied, and the law of the state whose interest and policies would be most impaired is applied.

The Ninth Circuit Applies a New Standard

The Ninth Circuit articulated a new standard to evaluate whether state laws are materially different. The court stated that a material difference in state laws is outcome-determinative. Applying this standard, the court found that there are outcome-determinative differences between California's consumer protection laws and the laws of other states with respect to scienter, reliance, and remedies. The court also held that state unjust enrichment laws vary in material respects.

As for the second step, the Ninth Circuit found that each of the 44 states has a strong interest in applying its consumer protection law to the transactions that took place within each state. The court explained that each state has the prerogative to set the "optimal balance between protecting consumers and attracting foreign businesses," and this may mean less "protection for consumers [in order] to create a more favorable business climate for the companies that the state seeks to attract to do business in the state."4 The court stated that the district court overlooked that "each state has an interest in setting the appropriate level of liability for companies conducting business within its territory," including limiting "excessive litigation."5

Regarding the third step of the test, the court stated that each state "has an interest in applying its law to transactions within its borders and that, if California law were applied to the entire class, foreign states would be impaired in their ability to calibrate liability to foster commerce."6 The court noted that the district court ignored each state's interest in promoting business and that the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) was aimed at stopping courts from ignoring pro-business laws. Because California has little interest in applying its law to residents of foreign states, the court held that each class member's claims should be governed by the consumer protection laws of the state in which the transaction took place.

The court, therefore, vacated the class certification order because variances in state law overwhelmed common issues and precluded predominance for a single nationwide class. The court did not, however, express any opinion concerning whether the district court still may be able to certify a California class or any subclasses of states that have essentially the same laws.

The plaintiffs, in their petition for en banc review (which was denied), made the dire prediction that the panel opinion "does not merely torpedo this particular nationwide class action against Honda, it also threatens to sink the nationwide class action device itself."7 While Mazza has affected class action litigation at the certification and pleadings stages, the concern of significant consumer impact has not yet come to fruition.

Mazza's significance at the class certification stage--the "main event"8 in class action litigation--is unmistakable. Certification of a nationwide or multistate class under a single state's law often implicates choice-of-law issues. Mazza has proven to be powerful authority for defendants seeking to defeat efforts to certify nationwide or multistate classes, particularly under California law.9

Most commentators recognize that federal courts have long been reluctant to extend a single state's law nationwide.10 According to the Senate report accompanying CAFA, from 1995 to 2005, no federal court certified a nationwide class using the law of a single state.11 Most often, it was state courts that certified a nationwide class under a single state's law. This phenomenon was apparent in California courts12 and in other states.13 Not surprisingly, one objective of CAFA was to reduce the number of large-scale interstate class actions in state courts.14

In this respect, Mazza carries forward a trend away from nationwide state-law class actions.15 Federal courts have long construed state choice-of-law principles to require that each putative class member's claims be governed by the laws of the member's home state.16 A minority of federal courts have gone the other way, extending a single state's law nationwide.17 Mazza, however, has provided binding legal authority requiring California district courts to take a close look at whether a nationwide class under California's consumer protection laws should be certified.

Mazza is the first Ninth Circuit decision to apply a choice-of-law analysis comparing California's consumer protection laws to consumer protection laws across the country and finding that the material differences between the states' laws counsel against using California's laws for transactions that occurred across the country. Mazza is also the first Ninth Circuit decision to emphasize the significant interests of states in which the transaction occurred.

Since Mazza, the majority of district courts have relied on Mazza's choice-of-law holding to deny requests to certify nationwide state-law class actions.18 Citing Mazza, the courts are finding that the laws of every state in which transactions took place apply. As Central District Judge Cormac Carney noted, a potential trial with so many different laws to apply would "devolve quickly into an unmanageable morass of divergent legal issues."19

The few post-Mazza courts that have certified multistate classes are easily distinguishable from Mazza. These cases, for example, include certified classes that consisted only of single-state subclasses,20 defendants that failed to meet their burden of proving material differences in state laws,21 and plaintiffs who did not seek to certify a class under FRCP 23(b)(3).22 In one case, the court warned that Mazza precludes certification in the future.23 In another, the classes were certified under federal law.24

Subclassing after Mazza

Because no contested nationwide state-law class actions have been certified after Mazza in the Ninth Circuit, effective and manageable subclassing will play an increasingly important role in efforts to certify multistate class actions. Class action proponents likely will cite the Ninth Circuit's statement that courts may, in appropriate circumstances, be able to certify subclasses grouped around "materially different bodies of state law."25 Not surprisingly, plaintiffs' attorneys have already stated that if a nationwide class is not viable, multiple subclasses of the largest states may be certified.26 The theory is that a class of 10 to 12 subclasses may appear more manageable. This will nevertheless require greater expenditure of time and effort, and thus cost.27

Keegan v. American Honda Motor Company28 is a recent example of how subclassing may, in the appropriate case, achieve certification of smaller but multistate subclasses. The plaintiffs in Keegan sought to assert a nationwide state-law class action, but in the alternative proposed a multistate subclassing scheme. The district court completed a detailed state-specific analysis of the various proposed subclasses, and, in light of Mazza, refused to certify a nationwide class under California law. The named plaintiffs hailed from different states, so the Keegan court certified several subclasses under the laws of each named plaintiff's home state. Keegan is thus one example of why Mazza does not necessarily signal the end of multistate class actions.

The same forces at work at the certification stage are at work when defendants attempt to decertify a previously certified class. There have been two reported decisions on decertification applying Mazza, and the motion was denied in both.29 Nevertheless, it appears that courts will decertify a class if the defendant meets its choice-of-law burden under Mazza.

Choice-of-Law Issues at the Pleading Stage

Courts usually will not conduct a detailed choice-of-law analysis during the pleading stage in class actions,30 and in ruling on a motion to dismiss a class action complaint prior to class certification, courts generally consider only the claims of the named plaintiffs.31 Thus, class allegations typically are tested on a motion for class certification, not at the pleading stage.32 Since Mazza, however, a surprising number of district courts have considered the effect of state law variations and have undertaken a choice-of-law analysis at the pleading stage. Courts do remain split as to whether such an analysis is premature. This divergence among courts presents the biggest change in class actions after Mazza.

Mazza does not change the basic premise that courts may properly determine choice-of-law issues at the pleading stage.33 Courts have long recognized that some choice-of-law issues may not require a full factual record and may be amenable to resolution on a motion to dismiss when the necessary facts appear in the complaint.34 Thus, some courts have struck class allegations if it is clear from the pleadings that class claims cannot be maintained.35 The decision concerning whether a choice-of-law issue is ripe or premature is made on a case-by-case basis.36

Mazza has reignited the debate concerning whether a choice-of-law analysis requires a fully developed factual record beyond what is pleaded in a complaint.37 Relying on Mazza, courts have declined to dismiss California law-based claims if the courts need more facts to make a decision. These courts note that Mazza may influence the decision whether to certify a proposed class or subclass, but a determination is premature or unripe at the pleading stage.38

The reasoning is that until the parties have explored the facts through discovery, it would be premature to speculate about whether the differences in consumer protection laws among states are material in the particular case. One court has offered additional reasons for delaying its decision, stating, "[O]nce the relevant facts of the case have been explored during discovery, it is possible that Plaintiff could narrow or define the class in such a way at the class certification stage to make any differences between applicable laws immaterial. Moreover, should choice-of-law analysis appear to pose problems at the class certification stage, Plaintiff could seek to certify subclasses of putative class members from individual states or subclasses of class members from groups of states with consumer protection laws that are not materially different."39

Other courts have declined to dismiss or strike class claims when the defendant has not properly maintained the burden of showing that foreign law should apply to the class claims.40 These district court decisions note that Mazza was influenced by the briefing of the defendant in that case who "exhaustively detailed the ways in which California law differs from the laws of the 43 other jurisdictions."41 If the defendant fails to meet its burden at this pleading stage to explain how differences in the various states' laws would materially affect the adjudication of plaintiffs' claims or otherwise explain why foreign laws should apply, courts should not dismiss or strike plaintiffs' state law class claims.42

However, if sufficient facts are pleaded, and the defendant has provided adequate analysis explaining why foreign law should apply, Mazza provides authority for courts to dismiss class allegations early. Indeed, one court summarily dismissed a plaintiff's nationwide class allegations based entirely on Mazza and without any detailed choice-of-law analysis.43

In one of the most interesting post-Mazza cases outside California, a district court in Ohio granted a motion to strike the nationwide class allegations after conducting a choice-of-law analysis and relying on Mazza.44 The court noted that Mazza determined "without conducting a factual analysis that variations in the elements required to satisfy a cause of action constituted material differences among the statutes."45 It also noted that "no discovery will change the simple fact that different states have different elements" and that these variations were material.46 After applying steps two and three of California's choice-of-law analysis, the court determined that a nationwide class could not be certified.

Courts may be likely to do a conflict-of-law analysis and dismiss the claims in a case in which a non-California named plaintiff brings California claims in a California court. For example, in Horvath v. LG Electronics,47 four named plaintiffs brought a class action in the Southern District of California, but only one named plaintiff was from California. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss. Applying the Mazza choice-of-law analysis, the court decided to apply California law only to the California named plaintiff. The court then dismissed the non-California named plaintiffs because the court would not apply California law to them. Other courts have followed this approach as well,48 some noting that a non-California plaintiff who makes the purchases outside of California does not have standing to assert California state law claims.49

Similarly, other courts reject California law claims in nationwide class actions in which the plaintiffs neither reside in California nor purchased their product in California, and the lawsuit is not brought in a California court.50 This reasoning rests on the presumption against extraterritorial application of California statutes when a claim is brought based on conduct that occurred outside of California.51

Other courts reject this approach to using choice-of law in the standing analysis, noting that "choice of law is not the same thing as standing."52 Standing requires that 1) the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact, 2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and 3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. Notably, the Mazza court rejected the defendant's standing argument despite the court's conclusion that the application of multiple jurisdictions' consumer protection laws precluded class treatment.

The courts following this approach have found allegations in the complaint sufficient to confer standing. For example, an out-of-state class member may allege an injury that is attributable to the defendant's conduct and that is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.53 Courts have rejected the defense argument that based on choice-of-law principles, the plaintiffs lack standing to assert California consumer protection claims because they are not California citizens and their alleged injuries occurred out of state.54 Some courts are simply reserving their judgment on choice-of-law issues and affording parties the chance to develop a sufficient record.55

Recent decisions show that Mazza's choice-of-law principles have had a profound impact on how class actions are litigated at the pleading stage. While there currently is no clear majority on whether Mazza should bar multistate class actions as early as the pleading stage, the significant number of cases in which the issue has already been presented make clear that Mazza's greatest impact may be in how it shapes the class definition long before a class certification motion is ever filed.

Certifying a nationwide class under California law has become significantly more difficult since Mazza.56 Some courts have certified multistate classes through subclasses, but Mazza appears to have erected a significant hurdle. Although Mazza is a class certification decision, its greatest impact appears to be in the pleading stage. Defendants have relied on Mazza to renew efforts to dispose of class claims at the pleading stage.

Ultimately, Mazza's choice-of-law hurdles are not insurmountable, but they present challenges. Plaintiffs likely will force defendants to carry their burden in showing that the other states have a greater interest in having their law applied.57 Other plaintiffs may elect to avoid the choice-of-law issue altogether by pursuing smaller, single-state class actions. Whether Mazza will forever end the practice of certifying nationwide classes under California law remains an open issue.

 

Endnotes

1 Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 F. 3d 581 (9th Cir. 2012).
2 Id. at 598-99 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
3 Id. at 585.
4 Id. at 592.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 593.
7 Petition for Rehearing En Banc, DktEntry 101-3, at 3, Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., No. 09-55376 (9th Cir. 2012).
8 Brian Anderson & Andrew Trask, The Class Action Playbook 134 (2010).
9 See Johnathan v. ING Bank, Fsb, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123927, at *41 n.23 (D. Del. Aug. 27, 2012); Ralston v. Mortgage Inv. Group, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45545, at *8-9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012); Kowalsky v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34597, at *19-20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2012); Gianino v. Alacer Corp., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1100-03 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (denying class certification based on Mazza); but see In re POM Wonderful LLC Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141150, at *12-14 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012); Cambridge Lane, LLC v. J-M Mfg. Co, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43533, at *17-18 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2012) (certifying a nationwide state-law class despite Mazza); but see Keegan v. American Honda Motor Co., 284 F.R.D. 504 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Guido v. L'Oreal, USA, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65200, at *47-48 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012) (certifying state-law subclasses after Mazza); but see Schilling v. TransCor Am. LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94602, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2012); Z.D. v. Group Health Coop., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76498, at *34 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2012) (certifying other types of classes despite Mazza).
10 See Joel S. Feldman, Class Certification Issues for Non-Federal Question Class Actions--Defense Perspective, 710 PLI/LIT 259, 346 (2004).
11 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 63-64 (2005), available at http://www.gpo.gov.
12 See, e.g., Wershba v. Apple Computer, Inc., 91 Cal. App. 4th 224, 243 (2001); Clothesrigger, Inc. v. GTE Corp., 191 Cal. App. 3d 605, 614-15 (1987).
13 See, e.g., Phillips v. Ford Motor Co., No. 99ā€“Lā€“1041 (Cir. Ct. Madison County, Ill. Sept. 15, 2003); Naef v. Masonite Corp., No. CVā€“94ā€“4033 (Cir. Ct. Mobile County, Ala. 1995).
14 See Steven J. Shapiro, Applying the Jurisdictional Provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005: In Search of a Sensible Judicial Approach, 59 Baylor L. Rev. 77, 81 (2007).
15 See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Life after Amchem: The Class Struggle Continues, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 373, 375-76 (1998); Michael Isaac Miller, Comment, The Class Action (Un)Fairness Act of 2005: Could It Spell the End of the Multi-State Consumer Class Action?, 36 Pepp. L. Rev. 879, 905 (2009); Ryan Patrick Phair, Comment, Resolving the "Choice-of-Law Problem" in Rule 23(B)(3) Nationwide Class Actions, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 835, 841-42 (2000).
16 Miller, supra note 15, at 896 & n.98 (citing case examples).
17 See, e.g., In re Mercedes-Benz Tele Aid Contract Litig., 257 F.R.D. 46 (D. N.J. 2009).
18 See Gianino v. Alacer Corp., 846 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1104 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Kowalsky v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34597 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 14, 2012); Ralston v. Mortgage Inv. Group, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45545 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012).
19 Gianino, 846 F. Supp. 2d at 1103-04; see also Doll v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 246 F.R.D. 683, 688-89 (D. Kan., 2007); Oxford v. Williams Cos., Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 756, 764 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
20 See, e.g., Keegan v. American Honda Motor Co., 284 F.R.D. 504 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Guido v. L'Oreal, USA, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65200, at *47-48 (C.D. Cal. May 7, 2012); Ralston, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45545.
21 See, e.g., In re POM Wonderful LLC Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141150, at *12-14 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2012); Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 542-43 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Cambridge Lane, LLC v. J-M Mfg. Co., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43533, at *17-18 & n.8 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 15, 2012).
22 See, e.g., Z.D. v. Group Health Coop., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76498 (W.D. Wash. June 1, 2012).
23 See, e.g., Smith v. Merial Ltd., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78220, at *19 n.8 (D. N.J. June 5, 2012); Cambridge Lane, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *17-18 & n.8.
24 See, e.g., Schilling v. TransCor Am. LLC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94602, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2012); Z.D., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76498.
25 Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., 666 F. 3d 581, 594 (9th Cir. 2012).
26 A Discussion of the Impact of Mazza v. Am. Honda Co. on the Future of Nationwide Class Action Litigation Under California's Consumer Protection Laws, ABA Section on Antitrust Law (May 31, 2012), available
at http://www.americanbar.org.
27 Pamela A. MacLean, Class Dismissed, California Lawyer 10 (Apr. 2012), available at http://www.callawyer.com; Dawn Goulet, Mazza v. Honda: The Death of Class Actions, or Just Making the Plaintiffs' Bar Work a Little Harder?, Wexler Wallace L. Firm Blog (Mar. 07, 2012); Ninth Circuit Further Curtails Consumer False Advertising Class Actions, Gordon Rees (Jan. 2012), http://www.gordonrees.com.
28 Keegan v. American Honda Motor Co., 284 F.R.D. 504 (C.D. Cal. 2012).
29 Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 280 F.R.D. 540, 542-43 (C.D. Cal. 2012); Yamada, D.D.S. v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG, Case No. CV 10-04849 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31 2012) (Dkt. No. 144).
30 In re Sony Grand WEGA KDF-E A10/A20 Series Rear Projection HDTV TV Litig., 758 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1096 (S.D. Cal. 2010).
31 Barth v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 661 F. Supp. 193, 203 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
32 In re Clorox Consumer Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120697, at *30 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012).
33 In re Land Rover LR3 Tire Wear Prods. Liab. Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90233, at *10 (C.D. Cal. May 14, 2012); see also General Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982); Knox v. Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53685, 2009 WL 1810728 at *2-4 (D. N.J., June 25, 2009); Cooper v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 374 Fed. App'x. 250, 255 n.5 (3d Cir. 2010).
34 Harper v. LG Elecs. U.S., Inc., 595 F. Supp. 2d 486, 491 (D.N.J. 2009); Montich v. Miele USA, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 2d 439, 445 (D. N.J. 2012).
35 In re Clorox Consumer Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *30.
36 Montich, 849 F. Supp. 2d 439 at 445.
37 Compare In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146971, at *68-69 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2012); Montich, 849 F. Supp. 2d at 449-51; Rikos v. P&G, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25104, at *21 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2012); Granfield v. NVIDIA Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98678, at *7-11 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2012); In re Hulu Privacy Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80601, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2012); Banks v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37754, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012); Horvath v. LG Elecs. MobileComm U.S.A., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19215, at *7-10 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2012) (cases dismissing or striking class allegations) with In re Clorox Consumer Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *31-32; Forcellati v. Hyland's, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91393, at *12-13 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2012); Donohue v. Apple, Inc., 2012 WL 1657119, at *7 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2012); Allen v. Hylands, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61606, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2012) (cases finding choice-of-law analysis premature or unripe at the pleading stage); see also Snyder v. Farnam Cos., 792 F. Supp. 2d 712, 718 (D. N.J. 2011); Arlandson v. Hartz Mt. Corp., 792 F. Supp. 2d 691, 702 (D. N.J. 2011).
38 Donohue v. Apple, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65860, at *20- 21 (N.D. Cal. May 10, 2012); In re Clorox Consumer Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *31-32; Forcellati, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91393, at *6.
39 Forcellati, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91393, at *7.
40 Washington Mut. Bank, FA v. Superior Ct., 24 Cal. 4th 906, 921 (2001).
41 In re Clorox Consumer Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *31.
42 See Donohue, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65860, at *21; Bruno v. Eckhart Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30873, at *24 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2012); In re Clorox Consumer Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *32; Forcellati, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91393, at *12-13.
43 Banks v. Nissan N. Am., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37754, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2012).
44 Rikos v. P&G, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25104, at *9-14 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2012).
45 Id. at *18.
46 Id. at *19.
47 Horvath v. LG Elecs. MobileComm U.S.A., Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19215, at *7-10 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2012)
48 See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 146971, at *68-69 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2012); Montich v. Miele USA, Inc., 849 F. Supp. 2d 439, 449-51 (D. N.J. 2012).
49 Granfield v. NVIDIA Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98678, at *7-11 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2012).
50 See, e.g., Rikos, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *9-14.
51 Id.; see also Sullivan v. Oracle Corp., 51 Cal. 4th 1191, 1207 (2011).
52 Allen v. Hylands, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61606, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 2, 2012).
53 Id. at *7.
54 See, e.g., id. at *4-7; Forcellati v. Hyland's, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91393, at *8-13 (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2012).
55 See, e.g., In re Clorox Consumer Litig., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120697, at *30 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2012); Donohue, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65860, at *20-21.
56 See Class Action for Attorneys: Hot Topics in 2012 LIVE Webcast, The Knowledge Group, LLC (Sept. 24, 2012) (presentation of Eric Y. Kizirian), available at http://www.knowledgecongress.org.
57 A Discussion of the Impact of Mazza v. Am. Honda Co. on the Future of Nationwide Class Action Litigation under California's Consumer Protection Laws, ABA Section on Antitrust Law (May 31, 2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org.

 


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