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Table of Contents    Cover    MCLE Test

MCLE Article and Self-Assessment Test

About Face

Does the 1992 amendment to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008 violate the doctrine of separation of powers? 

By Elizabeth M. Miller and Michel Y. Horton 

Elizabeth M. Miller is an associate and Michel Y. Horton is a partner at Zevnik Horton Guibord McGovern Palmer & Fognani, with Miller resident in the firm's New York City office and Horton resident in its Los Angeles office. Both are members of the State Bar of California and specialize in commercial litigation. 

Trial courts historically have been vested with broad inherent authority to reconsider their own rulings, either by motion of a party or sua sponte, but in 1992 the California legislature decided to restrict this authority. With the amendment of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1008, the legislature purported to limit the jurisdiction of California trial courts to reconsider their prior orders or rulings. There are now only three circumstances in which a trial court, under the statute, can exercise its reconsideration authority: 

  • If a party moves for reconsideration of an order within a 10-day period starting from when the notice of entry of the order was served, and the motion sets forth "new or different facts, circumstances, or law."       
  • If a party renews a prior motion it lost in whole or in part, with a showing of "new or different facts, circumstances, or law."       
  • If the court, sua sponte, determines that there has been a change in the law.1

On its face, Section 1008 appears to have created a jurisdictional bar to hearing reconsideration motions: arguably, it has stripped trial courts of their inherent power to reconsider prior rulings unless the procedural prerequisites of Section 1008 are met. It is questionable, however, whether the legislative amendment to Section 1008 is constitutional if interpreted in a manner to "defeat" or "materially impair"2 the trial court's inherent power to reconsider. 

In fact, the jurisdictional effect of Section 1008 has caused considerable controversy among the appellate districts. When called upon to review a trial court's grant or denial of a reconsideration motion, or to determine the scope of the trial court's discretion to change its mind and reverse its prior ruling, the appellate courts have not agreed on the appropriate application of Section 1008. 

California's First Appellate District, for example, has consistently construed Section 1008 as an inflexible legislative mandate to avoid reconsideration unless the explicit statutory requirement of "new or different facts, circumstances, or law" has been met.3 According to the First District, Section 1008 is genuinely jurisdictional, and it delimits the trial court's discretion to reconsider-whether by motion or on its own accord.4 

California's Fourth Appellate District takes a contrary view. The Fourth District has determined that Section 1008 does not trump the trial court's inherent power to reconsider and change its prior rulings, claiming that Section 1008 "must be treated as directory only" to the extent it purports to limit the trial court's jurisdiction.5 

In the middle of the debate is California's Second Appellate District. Initially, the Second District appeared to embrace an inflexible interpretation of the statute, similar to the First District's analysis.6 Subsequently, however, the Second District seemed to back away from a strict application of Section 1008 and moved toward recognizing the trial court's inherent discretion to reconsider.7 Recently, in Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt, the Second District ruled that Section 1008 does not limit a trial court's jurisdiction to grant reconsideration sua sponte, regardless of whether Section 1008's requirements are met.8 

The proper scope and application of the jurisdictional language of Section 1008 has broad real-world implications for lawyers in their daily practices. By strictly applying the section's jurisdictional language, rulings that may be demonstrably incorrect and unjust remain unalterable, despite the fact that the trial court has changed its mind. Although a ruling that may have appeared right at the time it was made is later shown to be incorrect, both the court and the parties, under amended Section 1008, are bound by the prior incorrect ruling. Further, on appeal of a reconsideration order, the reviewing court may only reexamine the jurisdiction of the trial court to reconsider, and thus it may never reach the question of whether-given the substantive effect of the reconsideration order-the trial court abused its discretion. 

The separation of powers doctrine in the California Constitution provides the basis for the constitutional objection to the legislature's restriction of the jurisdiction of trial courts to reconsider.9 This doctrine recognizes that the trial court's inherent powers-including the power to reconsider-are "judicial" in nature, "necessary appendage[s] to a court organized to enforce rights and redress wrongs."10 Thus, it follows that a trial court's fundamental obligation to do justice should not be subordinated to a procedural device devised by the legislature for administrative convenience. 

Further, according to the constitutional argument, in order to ensure justice rather than merely facilitate docket reduction, Section 1008 must be applied in a manner that results in meritorious, correct rulings, absent bad faith by the moving party or substantial prejudice to the opposing party. Thus, if a ruling is wrong, it should be corrected, and if a party can show that its cause of action or defense is well founded and substantially correct, a prior contrary ruling should not serve to defeat a just result. 

In short, the California Constitution grants the trial court the discretion and jurisdiction to alter its prior rulings at any time in a proceeding, so long as the court acts in a way that is just. At the same time, the constitution prohibits the legislature from enacting statutes that defeat or materially impair this inherent power, notwithstanding any concerns the legislature may have about the overloaded dockets of trial courts. 

Legislative Intent 

Section 1008 currently provides that all applications for reconsideration of a prior order, and all applications for renewal of a motion, must be supported by a showing of "new or different facts, circumstances, or law": 

  1. When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order….       
  2. A party who originally made an application for an order which was refused in whole or part, or granted conditionally or on terms, may make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law….       
  3. If a court at any time determines that there has been a change of law that warrants it to reconsider a prior order it entered, it may do so on its own motion and enter a different order.11 Further, the language in Section 1008(e) expressly limits the jurisdiction of trial courts to grant reconsideration only in those circumstances in which Section 1008's requirements are met:

      (e) This section specifies the court's jurisdiction with regard to applications for reconsideration of its orders and renewals of previous motions, and applies to all applications to reconsider any order of a judge or court, or for the renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous matter or motion is interim or final. No application to reconsider any order or for the renewal of a previous motion may be considered by any judge or court unless made according to this section.
Relying on this language, appellate courts have reversed trial court rulings granting reconsideration, and trial courts have refused to grant reconsideration, without any attempt to determine the correctness of the ruling or result. The reasoning underlying these decisions is that a trial court lacks jurisdiction to grant reconsideration if the statutory requirement of "new or different facts, circumstances, or law" is not met.12

The jurisdictional language in subdivision (e) of Section 1008 was added with the 1992 amendment.13 At the same time, the previous Section 1008 requirement that the party requesting reconsideration make a showing of "an alleged different state of facts" was replaced with the current "new or different facts, circumstances or law" requirement.14 

Notwithstanding the absence of jurisdictional language in the previous version of Section 1008, in interpreting and applying the pre-amendment version, the argument arose that trial courts had no authority to grant a motion for reconsideration in the absence of a showing of a "different state of facts." Some appellate courts, particularly those in the Second and Fourth Districts, held that trial courts retained the power to reconsider, even without a showing that Section 1008's procedural prerequisites had been met.15 In some of these decisions, the appellate courts specifically referred to the trial court's innate or inherent power to reconsider its prior rulings.16 In other decisions upholding the trial court's power to reconsider, the appellate courts went further and found that the trial court retains the inherent power to reconsider until judgment is entered-the point in the proceedings when the trial court loses jurisdiction for all purposes.17 In these decisions, the appellate courts distinguished between "interim" (i.e., nonappealable) and "final" (i.e., appealable) orders, ruling that reconsideration of the former was permissible-notwithstanding the failure to comply with Section 1008-while reconsideration of the latter was impermissible absent compliance with Section 1008.18 

It was this line of cases distinguishing between interim and final orders that the legislature sought to overrule when it amended Section 1008 by adding subdivision (e). The intent of the legislature, as presented in the Legislative Counsel's Digest, cannot be more clear: 

    The [l]egislature finds and declares the following: (a) Since the enactment of Section 1008 of the Code of Civil Procedure, some California courts have found that the section does not apply to interim orders. (b) In enacting Section 4 of this act [subdivision (e) of [S]ection 1008], it is the intent of the [l]egislature to clarify that no motions to reconsider any order made by a judge or court, whether that order is interim or final, may be heard unless the motion is filed within 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the order, and unless based on new or different facts, circumstances or law. (c) In enacting Section 4 of this act, it is the further intent of the [l]egislature to clarify that no renewal of a previous motion, whether the order deciding the previous motion is interim or final, may be heard unless the motion is based on new or different facts, circumstances or law.19

The legislature also declared that the limitation of the trial court's power to reconsider was justified in the interests of reducing the trial court's docket: 

    d) Inclusion of interim orders within the application of Section 1008 is desirable in order to reduce the number of motions to reconsider and renewals of previous motions heard by judges in this state. Thus, by enacting subdivision (e), and in the interests of administrative convenience, the legislature sought to confine the trial court's power to grant reconsideration by removing its jurisdiction to do so in all circumstances other than those specified in the statute.

If, as some of the pre-1992 amendment cases recognized, a trial court generally retains its jurisdiction until final judgment is entered,20 and if the power to reconsider is one of the trial court's innate or inherent powers,21 then the legislature's attempt to defeat or materially impair that power not only implicates the separation of powers doctrine22 but actually violates the California Constitution. 

Inherent Power 

The trial court's inherent power to reconsider its prior rulings, which remains in effect until entry of judgment, is well established. As early as 1889, the California Supreme Court recognized that "the power to grant rehearings is inherent, -is an essential ingredient of jurisdiction, -and ends only with the loss of jurisdiction."23 The inherent powers of the courts are those necessary "to insure the orderly administration of justice."24 

As an inherent power, the power to reconsider cannot depend on-or be confined by-any statute.25 As a constitutional power of the trial court, such a power can be regulated by the legislature, if the regulation is reasonable, but it cannot be taken away or defeated: 

    [T]he [l]egislature generally may adopt reasonable regulations affecting a court's inherent powers or functions, so long as the legislation does not "defeat" or "materially impair" a court's exercise of its constitutional power or the fulfillment of its constitutional function.26

In granting the state government three types of power-legislative, executive, and judicial-the California Constitution specifies that these powers are separate, stating expressly that "[p]ersons charged with the exercise of one power may not exercise either of the others except as permitted by this Constitution."27 Thus, the separation of powers doctrine is integral to the authority of the state to govern. If the legislature takes action regarding one of the trial court's inherent powers, it can only place "reasonable limitations" on that power-limitations that do not "defeat or materially impair" the trial court's exercise of its power to reconsider.28 By protecting the exercise of this power, the doctrine of separation of powers in effect ensures that the trial court will perform its essential function: the administration of justice. 

Barring a trial court from reconsidering a prior ruling (or modifying or reversing its prior ruling) unless certain procedural prerequisites are satisfied defeats the trial court's power to do justice. Therefore a strong argument can be made that Section 1008's purported jurisdictional bar to reconsideration is unconstitutional-whether applied to sua sponte reconsideration, or party applications, or motions for reconsideration.29 

Interpreting Section 1008(e) 

For the most part, the post-1992 reported appellate decisions construing the newly enacted subdivision (e) of Section 1008 do not recognize or address the constitutional problem the amendment poses. Instead, courts have almost uniformly applied the jurisdictional language to limit the trial court's power to reconsider. 

In the first reported decision interpreting the amended Section 1008, Morite of California v. Superior Court,30 the Second District in 1993 ruled that by enacting subdivision (e), the legislature had limited the jurisdiction of the trial courts: 

    Respondent court circumvented the jurisdictional limits of [S]ection 1008, subdivision (e) by consciously ignoring the stay order which had been entered by a predecessor judge of the same court….By making [S]ection 1008 expressly jurisdictional, the [l]egislature clearly intended to prevent courts from modifying, amending or revoking prior orders without due reconsideration. Ignoring (i.e., implicitly revoking) interim orders, such as the prior stay order, undermines the legislative intent behind [S]ection 1008, subdivision (e).31

In Morite, the Second District reversed a trial court's sua sponte order setting an action for trial-an order that implicitly, but not explicitly, reconsidered and reversed a prior judge's order staying the action.32 The Second District ruled that the trial court had improperly circumvented Section 1008 by ignoring the prior order instead of modifying, amending, or revoking it after due consideration.33 

Thereafter, the First District reached the same conclusion about the jurisdictional effect of the 1992 amendment. In a series of decisions-Gilberd v. AC Transit (issued in 1995), Garcia v. Hejmadi (1997), Baldwin v. Home Savings of America (1997), and Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc. (1998)-the First District ruled that Section 1008 is both exclusive and jurisdictional and, therefore, by granting reconsideration when the moving party did not meet Section 1008's requirements, the trial courts were acting beyond their jurisdiction.34 

By contrast, the Fourth District rejected the position that Section 1008 is exclusive and jurisdictional. In Gailing v. Rose, Klein & Marias, the Fourth District ruled in 1996 that Section 1008 is not jurisdictional: 

    The estate alternatively claims the trial court lacked the power to hear the renewed summary judgment motion. It reasons [S]ection 1008, subdivision (b) allows for renewed motions only when there are new facts or law, and [the case authority cited by the moving party] did not constitute new law. The provisions of [S]ection 1008 are not jurisdictional. The trial court has broad discretion to hear a renewed motion, even if prerequisites of the section are not met.35

In 1998, in People v. Castello, the Fourth District went even further.36 Recognizing that a trial court's power to reconsider its own rulings is an inherent power derived from the California Constitution, and that the doctrine of separation of powers allows the legislature to regulate but not defeat or materially impair the inherent powers of the courts, the Fourth District ruled that Section 1008 must be reformed to the extent that it may require anything more than the trial court's exercise of "due consideration" when granting reconsideration: 

    A court could not operate successfully under the requirement of infallibility in its interim rulings. Miscarriage of justice results where a court is unable to correct its own perceived legal errors….Therefore, if the language of [S]ection 1008 imports anything further, it must be treated as directory only. At most, therefore, [S]ection 1008 requires courts to exercise due consideration before modifying, amending or revoking prior orders. This is consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, whereby the [l]egislature may regulate the exercise of the court's inherent power, but its regulations must not "defeat or materially impair" the constitutional powers of the courts.37

Applying this reasoning, the Fourth District affirmed a trial court's grant of a party's motion for reconsideration, notwithstanding the party's failure to demonstrate "new or different facts, circumstances, or law."38 Further, the Fourth District expressly identified and declined to follow the line of First District decisions holding that Section 1008 is exclusive and jurisdictional.39 

In the Second District, the decisions after the 1993 Morite decision changed course. In Bernstein v. Consolidated American Insurance Company, a 1995 decision, the Second District upheld a reconsideration order, notwithstanding the absence of a showing that Section 1008's prerequisites had been met, on the stated reasoning that the "the court was not entertaining a motion of Consolidated for reconsideration of the prior ruling, but was correcting an erroneous ruling on its own motion."40 In In re Jamika W., a 1997 case, the Second District reached the same holding based on the same reasoning.41 Later, in 1998, the Second District upheld a reconsideration order in International Insurance Company v. Superior Court that was based on a determination that the law had changed. The court reasoned that subdivision (c) of Section 1008 authorized such reconsideration sua sponte and "at any time."42 

It was not until Darling, Hall & Rae, however, that the Second District recognized (albeit implicitly) the constitutional problem posed by subdivision (e).43 In Darling, Hall & Rae, the Second District in late September 1999 ruled that Section 1008's requirements need not be met when the trial court grants reconsideration sua sponte

    [S]ection 1008 does not govern the court's ability, on its own motion, to reevaluate its own interim rulings. Instead, the trial court retains the inherent authority to change its decision at any time prior to the entry of judgment. Section 1008 is designed to conserve the court's resources by constraining litigants who would attempt to bring the same motion over and over. On the other hand, these same judicial resources would be wasted if the court could not, on its own motion, review and change its interim rulings. Therefore, the only requirement of the court is that it exercise "due consideration" before modifying, amending, or revoking its prior orders.44

The Second District's holding in Darling, Hall & Rae appears to directly conflict with its holding six years earlier in Morite. In Darling, Hall & Rae, the court held that "[w]e find this line of cases holding [that] [S]ection 1008 is jurisdictional to be inapplicable because [S]ection 1008 does not govern the court's ability, on its own motion, to reevaluate its own interim rulings."45 On the other hand, in Morite, the court held that subdivision (e) limits the trial court's jurisdiction to reconsider its prior order sua sponte.46 Moreover, Darling, Hall & Rae holds that [S]ection 1008 does not limit a trial court's jurisdiction to reconsider sua sponte if [S]ection 1008's requirements are not met, while Morite holds that it does. Darling, Hall & Rae allows a trial court to meet the requirement of due consideration even when Section 1008's requirements are not fulfilled; by contrast, Morite does not permit due consideration unless the [S]ection 1008 requirements are met.47 

In sum, the different districts have taken irreconcilable approaches to the constitutional problem posed by subdivision (e). The First District is inflexible, and it recognizes no constitutional problem: the requirements the legislature set out in Section 1008 limit a trial court's jurisdiction to grant reconsideration, under all circumstances. The Fourth District stands at the other end of the spectrum: it not only acknowledges the constitutional problem but also asserts that Section 1008 "must be treated as directory only" and "[a]t most…[it] requires courts to exercise due consideration before modifying, amending or revoking prior orders."48 The Second District is somewhere in the middle: without directly addressing the constitutional problem-but acknowledging the Fourth District decisions that do so-the Second District has ruled that Section 1008's jurisdictional language "does not govern the court's ability, on its own, to reevaluate its own interim rulings….[T]he trial court retains the inherent authority to change its decision at any time prior to the entry of judgment."49 Unlike the Fourth District, the Second District has explicitly disavowed Section 1008's jurisdictional limits only in terms of reconsideration sua sponte and not with respect to a party's request for reconsideration. 

Flawed and Unconstitutional 

When it enacted Section 1008(e), the legislature declared that limiting the jurisdiction of the trial courts was necessary "to reduce the number of motions to reconsider and renewals of previous motions heard by judges in this state."50 Implicitly, the legislature concluded that litigants were abusing their right to move for reconsideration and, as a result, the trial courts faced an inordinate number of such motions. 

Even assuming that this conclusion were true, Section 1008 itself recognizes that there are other means for addressing such abuse, such as the sanctions provisions for bad faith motion practice.51 The few cases that have construed and applied this sanctions provision unanimously hold that sanctions should not be imposed unless the party acted in bad faith, even when the party failed to make a showing of the required "new or different facts, circumstances, or law."52 

Moreover, while limiting the trial court's jurisdiction to reconsider may be expedient-trial courts certainly may have fewer motions to hear-it is fundamentally inconsistent with the role of the trial court. The overriding job of the trial court is to do justice, to "enforce rights and redress wrongs."53 The trial court's power to reconsider is a necessary component of this task. Limiting the trial court's jurisdiction to reconsider its prior rulings-simply because the legislature wants to avoid the expense of having a wrong decision changed-makes it impossible for justice to prevail. If a trial court cannot perform its essential function to reconsider and right wrongs, the limitation on jurisdiction set forth in Section 1008(e) defeats or materially impairs an inherent power of the trial court. Thus, Section 1008 violates the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. The end targeted by the legislature-decreasing the number of motions for reconsideration-does not justify the means-eliminating the trial court's ability to do justice. 

In Castello, the Fourth District recognized the constitutional problem posed by the jurisdictional language in Section 1008 and elected to reform the statute by reading it as merely requiring trial courts "to exercise due consideration before modifying, amending or revoking prior orders."54 In Darling, Hall & Rae, the Second District also recognized, albeit implicitly, this constitutional problem, and it too held that "the only requirement of the court is that it exercise 'due consideration' before modifying, amending or revoking its prior orders."55 

But in reaching this holding, the Second District drew an unnecessary distinction between reconsideration granted sua sponte and reconsideration granted after application or motion. The distinction is constitutionally immaterial because the constitutional limitation on the power of the legislature to regulate the judiciary, arising as it does from the separation of powers doctrine, does not depend upon whether the court acts sua sponte or after an application or a motion. Further, as the case law illustrates, some action by a party affected by the prior order or ruling, even if not styled as a motion for reconsideration, often initiates a trial court's sua sponte reconsideration.56 

While these constitutional questions certainly require resolution, the lesson for practitioners in the meantime is that they should seek reconsideration whenever they have a good faith basis to do so-even when they cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 1008. As for the trial court, it should determine if due consideration warrants revisiting its prior orders or rulings-whether or not the moving party is entitled to reconsideration on the basis of a showing that Section 1008's requirements have been met. Appellate courts, for their part, should cease evading the question of whether a trial court abused its discretion in granting or denying reconsideration by resorting to the pronouncement that trial courts lack jurisdiction to do anything but deny reconsideration. 


1 Code Civ. Proc. §1008. 

2 Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 444 (1929). 

3 See, e.g., Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 4th 658, 669-70 (1st Dist. 1998); Garcia v. Hejmadi, 58 Cal. App. 4th 674, 685-91 (1st Dist. 1997); Baldwin v. Home Sav. of Am., 59 Cal. App. 4th 1192, 1195-1201 (1st Dist. 1997); Gilberd v. AC Transit, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1498-1501 (1st Dist. 1995). See also Crotty v. Trader, 50 Cal. App. 4th 765, 770-71 (1st Dist. 1996). 

4 See, e.g., Gilberd, 32 Cal. App. 4th at 1498-99. 

5 See, e.g., People v. Castello, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1247-49 (4th Dist. 1998); Gailing v. Rose, Klein & Marias, 43 Cal. App. 4th 1570, 1579 (4th Dist. 1996). 

6 Morite of Cal. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 4th 485, 487-93 (2d Dist. 1993). 

7 See, e.g., International Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 784, 787-88 (2d Dist. 1998); In re Jamika W., 54 Cal. App. 4th 1446, 1450 (2d Dist. 1997); Bernstein v. Consol. Am. Ins. Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 763, 773-74 (2d Dist. 1995). See also Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Palos Verdes Estates, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1810, 1865-66 (2d Dist. 1996). 

8 Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt, 75 Cal. App. 4th 1148, 1155-57 (2d Dist. Sept. 27, 1999). 

9 See Cal. Const. art. III, §3 (setting forth separation of powers doctrine). See, e.g., Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th 45, 52-59 (1996) (applying separation of powers doctrine); Lorraine v. McComb, 220 Cal. 753, 756 (1934) (same). 

10 Lorraine, 220 Cal. at 756 (quoting Ringlander v. Star Co., 90 N.Y.S. 772, 774-75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1904). See also Marin Water & Power Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 171 Cal. 706, 711 (1916) (judicial function is to declare law and determine rights of parties in controversy before court). 

11 Code Civ. Proc. §§1008(a)-(c) (emphasis added). 

12 See, e.g., Gilberd v. AC Transit, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1498-1500 (1st Dist. 1995). 

13 Compare Code Civ. Proc. §1008 (1999) with Code Civ. Proc. §1008 (1991). 

14 See Code Civ. Proc. §1008 (1991). 

15 See, e.g., Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. App. 2d 919, 928 (4th Dist. 1969); Lopez v. Larson, 91 Cal. App. 3d 383, 392 (4th Dist. 1979); Strick v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. App. 3d 916, 921 (2d Dist. 1983); Donahue v. State, 178 Cal. App. 3d 795, 799-800, 801 (2d Dist. 1986). 

16 See, e.g., Strick, 43 Cal. App. 3d at 921. 

17 See, e.g., Blue Mountain Dev. Co. v. Carville, 132 Cal. App. 3d 1005, 1012-14 (2d Dist. 1982); Passavanti v. Williams, 225 Cal. App. 3d 1602, 1606 (5th Dist. 1990). Similarly, in decisions rendered after the 1992 amendment, appellate courts have ruled that the trial court's power to reconsider terminates when entry of judgment effectively concludes the trial court's jurisdiction over the action. See, e.g., APRI Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 1999 WL 1013057, at *3 (2d Dist. Nov. 9, 1999); Ramon v. Aerospace Corp., 50 Cal. App. 4th 1233, 1236 (2d Dist. 1996); Nave v. Taggert, 34 Cal. App. 4th 1173, 1177 (5th Dist. 1995). 

18 See, e.g., Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 3 Cal. App. 4th 313, 316-18 (2d Dist. 1992). 

19 S.B. 1805, 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 460, §1. For the complete Legislative Counsel's Digest, see Historical and Statutory Notes to Code Civ. Proc. §1008 (West 1993). 

20 See, e.g., Blue Mountain Dev. Co., 132 Cal. App. 3d at 1012-14. 

21 See, e.g., Strick v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. App. 3d 916, 921 (2d Dist. 1983). 

22 See, e.g., People v. Castello, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1247-49 (4th Dist. 1998). 

23 In re Jessup, 81 Cal. 408, 468, 470 (1889). See also Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams, 19 Cal. 2d 463, 469, 475-76 (1942) ("This court has inherent power to revise, modify, and correct its judgments so long as they are under its control and may, in the exercise of that power, grant rehearings on application of the parties or on its own motion."). 

24 Walker v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 3d 257, 266-67 (1991). 

25 Id. 

26 Superior Court v. County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th 45, 58-59 (1996) (quoting Brydonjack v. State Bar, 208 Cal. 439, 444 (1929)). See also In re Jessup, 81 Cal. at 469 (citing Ex parte Harker, 49 Cal. 465, 467 (1874)). 

27 Cal. Const. art. III, §3. 

28 County of Mendocino, 13 Cal. 4th at 57-58 (quoting In re McKinney, 70 Cal. 2d 8, 10-11 (1968), and Brydonjack, 208 Cal. at 444)); In re Jessup, 81 Cal. at 469 (citing Ex parte Harker, 49 Cal. at 467). 

29 The separation of powers doctrine does not prohibit the legislature from reasonably regulating the reconsideration process by dictating the requirements that litigants must meet before a court will hear their requests. As an early decision from the Fourth District recognized, empowering the legislature to dictate when a litigant is entitled to process from a court is not the same as empowering the legislature to dictate when a court is forbidden from granting a litigant process. See, e.g., Big Bear Mun. Water Dist. v. Superior Court, 269 Cal. App. 2d 919, 928 (4th Dist. 1969) ("It is true that where no new grounds are shown a court is not obligated to grant a motion for reconsideration [citations omitted], but this is not the equivalent of saying that a court has no jurisdiction to reconsider where no new grounds are shown."). 

30 Morite of California v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 4th 485, 487 (2d Dist. 1993). 

31 Id. at 492-93. 

32 Id. at 487. 

33 Id. at 492-93. 

34 Gilberd v. AC Transit, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1494, 1498-1501 (1st Dist. 1995); Garcia v. Hejmadi, 58 Cal. App. 4th 674, 685-91 (1st Dist. 1997); Baldwin v. Home Sav. of Am., 59 Cal. App. 4th 1192, 1195-1201 (1st Dist. 1997); Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 4th 658, 669-70 (1st Dist. 1998). See also Crotty v. Trader, 50 Cal. App. 4th 765, 770-71 (1st Dist. 1996) (commenting that under Code Civ. Proc. §1008, "the court may grant reconsideration only if presented with 'new or different facts, circumstances, or law'"). 

35 Gailing v. Rose, Klein & Marias, 43 Cal. App. 4th 1570, 1578 (4th Dist. 1996). 

36 People v. Castello, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1246-50 (4th Dist. 1998) (rejecting assertion that Code Civ. Proc. §1008 applied to criminal matters-but even if it were applicable, it would not limit the court's inherent power to reconsider). 

37 Id. at 1249-50 (footnote and citations omitted). 

38 Id. at 1245-46. 

39 Id. at 1249 n.6 (citing Gilberd v. AC Transit, 32 Cal. App. 4th 1494 (1st Dist. 1995); Pazderka v. Caballeros Dimas Alang, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 4th 658 (1st Dist. 1998); Baldwin v. Home Sav. of Am., 59 Cal. App. 4th 1192 (1st Dist. 1997); Crotty v. Trader, 50 Cal. App. 4th 765 (1st Dist. 1996); and Garcia v. Hejmadi, 58 Cal. App. 4th 674 (1st Dist. 1997)). 

40 Bernstein v. Consol. Am. Ins. Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 763, 773-74 (2d Dist. 1995). 

41 In re Jamika W., 54 Cal. App. 4th 1446, 1450 (2d Dist. 1997). 

42 International Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 784, 787-88 (2d Dist. 1998). See also Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Palos Verdes Estates, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1810, 1865-66 (2d Dist. 1996) (suggesting that the trial court had discretion to consider renewed motion for summary judgment, and citing Gailing v. Rose, Klein & Marias, 43 Cal. App. 4th 1570 (4th Dist. 1996)). But see In re Oropallo, 68 Cal. App. 4th 997, 1002 (2d Dist. 1998) (suggesting that Code Civ. Proc. §1008 limits trial court's discretion to reconsider). 

43 Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt, 75 Cal. App. 4th 1148, 1155-57 (2d Dist. Sept. 27, 1999). 

44 Darling, Hall & Rae, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 1156-57 (citing People v. Castello, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1248-50 (4th Dist. 1998), and Nave v. Taggert, 34 Cal. App. 4th 1173, 1177 (5th Dist. 1995)). 

45 Id. at 1156. 

46 Morite of California v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 4th 485, 489-90 (2d Dist. 1993). 

47 Darling, Hall & Rae, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 1157; Morite, 19 Cal. App. 4th at 492. 

48 Castello, 65 Cal. App. 4th at 1249-50. 

49 Darling, Hall & Rae, 75 Cal. App. 4th at 1156-57. 

50 S.B. 1805, 1992 Cal. Stat. ch. 460, §1. 

51 Code Civ. Proc. §1008(d)("A violation of this section may be punished as a contempt and with sanctions as allowed by [§]128.7 [regarding bad faith conduct]."). See also Code Civ. Proc. §1008(c) (1991) ("A violation of this section may be punished as a contempt."). 

52 See, e.g., In re Drake, 53 Cal. App. 4th 1139, 1168-69 (2d Dist. 1997); Lucas v. Santa Maria Pub. Airport Dist., 39 Cal. App. 4th 1017, 1028 (2d Dist. 1995); Tutor-Saliba-Perini Joint Venture v. Superior Court, 233 Cal. App. 3d 736, 744-45 (2d Dist. 1991). 

53 See, e.g., Lorraine v. McComb, 220 Cal. 753, 756 (1934). 

54 People v. Castello, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1242, 1250, and 1250 n.8 (4th Dist. 1998). 

55 Darling, Hall & Rae v. Kritt, 75 Cal. App. 4th 1148, 1157 (2d Dist. Sept. 27, 1999). 

56 See Bernstein v. Consol. Am. Ins. Co., 37 Cal. App. 4th 763, 773-74 (2d Dist. 1995) (trial court reconsidered and reversed prior order "[i]n response to [moving party's] motion for clarification"); In re Jamika W., 54 Cal. App. 4th 1446, 1450 (2d Dist. 1997) (trial court reconsidered and reversed prior order after party filed objections to order); International Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 4th 784, 787-88 (trial court reconsidered and reversed prior order after party moved for reconsideration). 


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