Remedies Newsletter 

Brought to you by LACBA’S Provisional and Post-Judgment Remedies Section
September, 2005 • Volume 1, Number 1



Federal Law 

Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 Sees Revision
FDCPA and RICO Claims Asserted Against Judgment Creditor

California Law

Jurisdiction of State Court to proceed with Contempt
Proceedings After Bankruptcy Filing

New Statutes Affecting Pre- and Post-Judgment Remedies
California Supreme Court Permits Lis Pendens on Fraudulent
Transfer Claim Before Judgment or Attachment of Money Claim
Breakfast With the Experts – Notes from Breakfast Meeting
Membership Benefits of the PPJR Section 

Mel Aranoff, Chair
Peter A. Davidson, Vice-Chair
Jerome J. Blum, Secretary
David L. Ray, Treasurer
Russell H. Rapoport, Editor


Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act of 1940 Sees Revision
by Holly A. Hayes, Esq.
Ivanjack, Shuck & Milstead, LLP

On December 19, 2003, President Bush signed into law, H.R.100, the Service Members Civil Relief Act (SCRA, or Act). SCRA replaces and amends the Soldiers’ and Sailors' Civil Relief Act (SSCRA) of 1940, 50 U.S.C. App. §501 et seq. The new act provides military personnel - including those deployed or called to active duty, as well as reservists and inductees called into service - greater protections to handle their personal financial and legal obligations than those afforded under SSCRA. Significant changes added in the SCRA, are as follows:

I. An automatic 90-day stay of civil proceedings upon application by the service member. This applies to all judicial and administrative hearings. Section 524 of the Act provides:

(a) COURT ACTION UPON MATERIAL AFFECT DETERMINATION - If a service member, in the opinion of the court, is materially affected by reason of military service in complying with a court judgment or order, the court may on its own motion and shall on application by the service member:

(1) stay the execution of any judgment or order entered against the service member; and

(2) vacate or stay an attachment or garnishment of property, money, or debts in the possession of the service member or a third party, whether before or after judgment.

(b) APPLICABILITY- This section applies to an action or proceeding commenced in a court against a service member before or during the period of the service member's military service or within 90 days after such service terminates.

II. The SCRA makes clear that the 6 percent limitation on interest rates for pre-service debts requires a reduction in monthly payments, and that any interest in excess of 6 percent is forgiven, not deferred. This protection does not apply to charges made by the service member after he or she enters active duty, is mobilized or activated. But Section 527 of the Act makes clear that in order for an obligation or liability of a service member to be subject to the interest rate limitation, the service member shall provide to the creditor written notice and a copy of the military orders calling the service member to military service and any orders further extending military service, not later than 180 days after the date of the service member's termination or release from military service. In other words, the service member has to notify the creditor in writing of his or her activation. This is a significant change from the SSCRA to the SCRA because in the past the service member wasn't required, initially, to provide this or within a specified timeline. It appears that once requested the limitation is automatic. However, a creditor is permitted to and may challenge the limitation in court after the fact. 50 U.S.C. app. §527.

III. The SCRA expands the protection against eviction. Under the SSCRA, service members and their dependents who entered into a lease for $1,200 or less could not be evicted without a court order. The SCRA increases the maximum lease amount to $2,400 and adds an annual adjustment for inflation. For 2004, the maximum is $2,465. 50 U.S.C. app. §531.

IV. The SCRA gives service members who receive permanent change of station (PCS) orders, or who are being deployed for not less than 90 days the right to terminate a housing lease with 30 days' written notice. Prior to enactment of SCRA, service members could be required to pay for housing they were unable to occupy. 50 U.S.C. app. §535.

V. SCRA provides added protection for service members who have motor vehicle leases. Any active-duty service member who has a PCS order outside the continental United States, or who is being deployed for not less than 180 days, may terminate a motor vehicle lease. The law prohibits early termination charges. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 532, 535.

TIP: It is incumbent upon creditors to dust off the old SSCRA and bone up on the new provisions of SCRA.

THE CIT GROUP/EQUIPMENT FINANCING, INC. v. SUPER DVD, INC., 115 Cal. App. 4th 537, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 927 (2004).
In this case, the lessees had entered into a master lease agreement with the lessor relating to certain equipment. The lessor claimed that the lessees defaulted and sold the equipment, leaving a deficiency balance. The lessor sought a writ of attachment to recover the deficiency, which the trial court granted. On appeal, the lessees argued that the damages under the contract were uncertain because at the time of formation, it was impossible to know how many payments would have been made. Thus, the lessees claimed that a debt owing under a lease was not subject to attachment.
The court disagreed and affirmed, noting that uncertainty as to the specific amount of ultimate damages was not a basis to deny attachment. Under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §483.010(a), which authorized attachments, leases of real or personal property were included. The court held that in this case, there was no profit or other calculation to be made to ascertain the monthly rent due. The court found that each of the lease schedules set forth the rental period and the monthly rent due for each piece of equipment. It found that the contract provided a clear and definite formula for the computation of damages, and thus the order of attachment was proper.

HAGAN ENGINEERING, INC. v. DANIEL G. MILLS, 115 Cal. App. 4th 1004, 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723 (2004).
Pursuant to a settlement agreement, an employer dismissed with prejudice its trade secret action against defendants and defendants dismissed with prejudice their federal court action against the employer. The employer subsequently believed that defendants violated the agreement and sought to enforce the agreement under Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §664.6. The trial court granted injunctive and other relief to the employer.

On appeal, the court reversed. The court first determined that the trial court's judgment was appealable because its substance and effect was to finally dispose of the old action. The court then noted that absent a pending lawsuit, the trial court could not issue judgments or orders. As such, the employer's dismissal with prejudice of the lawsuit had deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §581. The court held that the language in the settlement agreement that purported to vest the trial court with retained jurisdiction after the dismissal was a nullity because subject matter jurisdiction could not be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel. The court held that the employer should have sought to vacate the dismissal and reinstate its prior action. Alternatively, it would appear that an order providing for the court to retain subject matter jurisdiction could have been sought, however, the likelihood of entry of such an order is remote.

It is interesting to note that the publication status of this case was changed by the Court from Unpublished to Published on February 18, 2004.


FDCPA and RICO Claims Asserted Against Judgment Creditor
by Russell H. Rapoport, Esq.
Plotkin, Rapoport & Nahmias, P.C.

Here is a scary scenario. Creditor gets a million dollar plus jury award and judgment against debtor based upon various business interference torts. Creditor then makes demands upon various persons believed to be indebted to the debtor, and creditor files a fraudulent transfer to get to debtor’s residence and other property transferred to a family limited partnership and to a limited liability company, allegedly with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditor. Debtor then files an action in the District Court alleging that the judgment enforcement actions violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o ("FDCPA"), and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 ("RICO") along with other pendent state law claims. That is what happened in Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 2004). The District Court granted the second motion to dismiss and the 9th Circuit affirmed. But don’t take too much comfort from that seemingly just dessert. Instead of a simple "those laws don’t apply to judgment enforcement" that an enforcement lawyer would like to have seen, the court delved into the minutia of both statutes. It held that the FDCPA didn’t apply in this instance because the judgment was based upon a commercial judgment, not a consumer judgment. The court then went on to hold regarding the RICO claims that, "appellees’ alleged actions, like those just mentioned, failed to satisfy H.J. Inc.’s open-ended continuity requirement since the alleged actions were finite in nature in that the mailings, faxes and telephone calls would cease once appellees collected the outstanding tort judgment against Stephen Turner." Debtor had argued that the activity was "open-ended" because the collection activity would last until the judgment was collected, but that would never happen because he was judgment proof. Thank goodness the Court didn’t buy that one.


The Jurisdiction of the State Court to Proceed with Contempt Proceedings after Bankruptcy Filing
by Leslie R. Horowitz, Esq.
Clark & Trevithick, P.C.

Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, an automatic stay is imposed on all pending matters including pending state court litigation. 11 U.S.C. §362. The cessation of state court proceedings and deference to the Bankruptcy Court is ordinarily a peaceful and noncontroversial procedure. However, occasionally a pending criminal proceeding or a contempt proceeding in state court creates a less peaceful transition from state court to Bankruptcy Court.

One of the basic provisions of the Constitution is the Supremacy Clause which states that the federal laws take precedence over the laws of the states and territories. U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2, In re Cybernetics Services, Inc. (Maldo v. Matsco, Inc.), 252 F.3d 1039, 1045 (9th Cir. 2001), Topa Equities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 342 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th Cir. 2003). The Constitution expressly provides that bankruptcy is a body of federal law that takes precedent over state law, and that Congress granted original and exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Courts for all cases involving bankruptcy. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 9, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a), In re Gruntz (Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles), 202 F.3d 1074, 1080 (9th Cir. 2000).

To make sure that all pending matters are properly transferred to the Bankruptcy Court upon the filing of a petition, certain procedures have been established. When a pending state court case is removed to Bankruptcy Court, Bankruptcy Rule 9027(c) provides that upon filing the Notice of Removal, "[t]he parties shall proceed no further in that court unless and until the claim or cause of action is remanded." Moreover, the Code specifically provides that if there is a state court receiver duly appointed before the bankruptcy petition is filed, the receiver must deliver any property of the bankruptcy estate to the trustee unless excused by the Bankruptcy Court. 11 U.S.C. §543(b). While this involves a procedure to make sure that the Bankruptcy Court has control over the entire bankruptcy estate rather than an adjudication of a possible contempt of a state court order, it further evidences the desire of Congress to maintain control in the Bankruptcy Court and to limit the matters in which the state court retains an interest.

One of the exceptions in the Code to the automatic stay is the commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding against the debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(1). Interestingly, civil contempt proceedings are somewhat criminal in nature. The People v. Beeson, (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1410, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 384, In re Witherspoon, (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 1000, 1001-1002, 209 Cal.Rptr. 67.

The question is what happens to a pending contempt proceeding once a bankruptcy petition is filed and whether or not the removal of a pending state court proceeding leaves the state court with any authority whatever to vindicate its own orders.

In re Si Yeon Park, Ltd. (State Street Bank and Trust v. Park), 198 B.R. 956 (Bankr.C.D.Cal. 1996) made a comprehensive review of this issue. The pending State Court case was removed to the Bankruptcy Court and a Chapter 11 Trustee was appointed. The Trustee filed an adversary proceeding in the bankruptcy case for, among other things, turnover of the debtor's assets. In response, the receiver brought a state court motion to hold the Trustee and his counsel in contempt for violation of California Code of Civil Procedure § 568 requiring permission of the State Court, to proceed with a lawsuit against the receiver. There was no allegation of a violation of any State Court order, nor was the debtor the party who was the subject of the contempt motion.

The state court insisted on holding the hearing and even though the receiver tried to withdraw the motion to comply with the Bankruptcy Court’s order, he was caught between competing orders. He brought an emergency motion in Bankruptcy Court for instructions. The court was less than sympathetic since the receiver had created the problem by asking the state court to hold the trustee in contempt in the first place! Unfortunately, the state court judge refused to recognize that upon removal he had no further jurisdiction over the case.

The Bankruptcy Court held that it and not the state court had the power to determine the propriety of complaints over turnover by the trustee. Further, the receiver had no duty to comply with state law or to obtain the permission of the state court before suing the receiver on account of turnover issues. The state court had no jurisdiction to rule on contempt proceedings because after removal, the state court had no jurisdiction remaining. However, the Bankruptcy Court could not enjoin the state court. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). The bankruptcy exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28, U.S.C. §2283 does not authorize the Bankruptcy Court to enjoin a state court, but the Bankruptcy Court can enjoin the individuals from prosecuting matters in state court, In re Jacksen, 105 B.R. 542 (9th Cir. BAP 1989).

The opinion in Park urged the state court to reconsider its position in light of the authority cited in the opinion. It points out that if that did not work, the individuals being caught between the state and federal courts could resort to the state Court of Appeal, a court that does have authority to order the state trial court from proceeding.

The situation is somewhat different when the pending state court matter is a criminal proceeding and not a quasi-criminal proceeding like contempt. Gruntz v. County of Los Angeles, 202 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2000 en banc) held that a pending criminal prosecution for failure to pay child support was not stayed by the bankruptcy and could not be deemed a "collection" proceeding that would subject the case to Bankruptcy Court jurisdiction. 202 F.3d at 1085. The Court stated: "However, there is 'no rationale or justification for severing economic and noneconomic ramifications of the debtor's criminal conduct. Further, in the case of the automatic stay, Congress has specifically subordinated the goals of economic rehabilitation and equitable distribution of assets to the states' interest in prosecuting criminals. The State of California has chosen to criminalize a parent's failure to support a dependent child." 202 F.3d at 1086. In the case of a pending criminal preceding the Bankruptcy Court’s adjudication of the financial obligations of the debtor should not limit the ability of the state court to determine if a debtor has violated the penal laws or if there is a violation, from imposing the punishment prescribed by the Legislature. On the other hand, removal applies only to a civil case and includes the entire case. The state courts must recognize that upon removal, the state court utterly lacks jurisdiction and must defer to the federal court. A violation of a state court order made in the civil case can and should be tried by the Bankruptcy Court. While in any other context it is generally preferable to have the court that issued the order itself determine whether or not a party is in contempt, the state courts should be comfortable that the Bankruptcy Court will protect the sanctity of a state court order.

(Special thanks to Judith Ilene Bloom for her editorial assistance.)


New Statutes Affecting Pre and Post Judgment Remedies
by Peter A. Davidson, Esq.
Rein Evans & Sestanovich LLP

2004 saw the legislature enact a number of new statutes, or amendments to existing statutes, which will have an impact on pre and post judgment remedies. One of the more significant changes which will affect our practice is the change, once again, to California Code of Civil Procedure § 1005. The statute was amended, effective January 1, 2005, to provide that a moving party must file and serve his or her motion at least sixteen (16) court days, instead of twenty-one (21) calendar days, prior to the hearing on the motion. Therefore, in calendaring any motion one must determine what is a court date. Court dates do not include weekends or days when the court is closed, for example national or state holidays. To make things more difficult, the legislature did not change the number of days that must be added if a motion is served by mail. That remains five (5) calendar days. Therefore, if you file a motion it must be filed and served at least sixteen (16) court days prior to the hearing, and if your motion is served by mail, five (5) calendar days must be added to that. Opposing papers are now due nine (9) court days, instead of ten (10) calendar days, prior to the hearing and reply papers are now due five (5) court days instead of five (5) calendar days prior to the hearing. A recent article in the Daily Journal pointed out that you can run into difficulties in calendaring your motion depending on whether you first count the sixteen (16) court days or first count the five (5) calendar days and whether you count backwards from the hearing date or forward from the date of service. While there is no case law directly on point, since the statue was just amended, prior law indicates that the proper method of determining the date for calendaring a motion is to count backwards from the hearing date. Because C.C.P. § 1013(a) states a period of notice "shall be extended five (5) calendar days, upon service by mail" one should count back from the hearing date sixteen (16) days and then five (5) calendar days, if service is by mail. The legislature amended the statute because, purportedly, it was concerned that C.C.P. § 1005 was silent about the correct method for calculating the deadline for service and filing of motion papers when the deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday and was concerned that the existing statute permitted parties to manipulate the length of time for service by filing motions on certain days of the week. It hoped that the new statute would clarify the law, reduce gamesmanship, and eliminate ambiguity about the proper deadlines for filing motions by using court days instead of calendar days. As indicated, its goal of eliminating ambiguity and creating clarity missed the mark. Indeed, this is the tenth (10th) time since 1980 that the legislature has amended CCP § 1005 in hopes of eliminating gamesmanship and creating clarity. Given the results of the latest amendment is probably not the last time the section will be amended.

Another statute affecting pre and post judgment remedies was the addition of Civil Code § 3439.04(b) which relates to fraudulent transfers. The legislature has now put into the statute what are known as the "badges of fraud" used in common law. It has listed eleven (11) such "badges" to aid the court in determining "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud" a creditor. The statute indicates this addition is merely "declaratory of existing law."

Also of significance is the adoption of Family Code § 297.5(m) giving registered domestic partners rights that are equivalent to those of spouses, particularly with regard to community property. A registered domestic partner not only includes persons of the same sex but can include persons of the opposite sex over age 62. Not only does the statute create new rights for registered domestic partners, it also creates liabilities for them. Now just like a spouse can be liable for a community debt, so can a registered domestic partner. In the future, therefore, in commencing litigation, conducting judgment debtor examinations, and in depositions one should inquire as to whether the defendant, if not married, has a registered domestic partner.


California Supreme Court Permits Lis Pendens on Fraudulent Transfer Claim Before Judgment or Attachment on Money Claim
by Jerome J. Blum, Esq.
Herzlich & Blum, LLP

In Kirkeby v. Superior Court, 2004DJDAR 8917, July 22, 2004, the California Supreme Court held that a fraudulent transfer claim alleging an actual transfer of real property supports the recording of a notice of pendency of action (pursuant to C.C.P. §405 et. seq.), commonly known as a lis pendens. This holding clarifies and confirms a very significant tool for attorneys representing creditors. Kirkeby makes it clear that even before obtaining a Judgment (or a right to attach order) on a claim for money damages, and in the same lawsuit, a party can record a lis pendens in conjunction with a fraudulent transfer claim.

The Supreme Court resolved a split of authority by reversing the 4th District Court of Appeal (Kirkeby v. Superior Court, (2003) 109 Cal. App. 4th 1275) and following the reasoning of the First District Court of Appeals (in Hunting World v. Superior Court, (1994) 22 Cal. App. 4th 67). In so doing, the Supreme Court rejected the Kirkeby Appellate Court’s attempt to extend the rationale of the "constructive trust" line of cases to the fraudulent transfer area. (Significant cases in this area include Urez Corp. v. Superior Court, (1987) 190 Cal. App. 3d 1141, LaPaglia v. Superior Court, (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1322 and Lewis v. Superior Court, (1994) 30 Cal. App.4th 1850.) Those courts said that where the real claim was for money damages and not about specific real property, merely adding a real property claim to support a lis pendens in order to tie up the property, (thereby making it available for execution once the money damages claim was adjudicated), was impermissible. In fact, they said that such tactics constituted an "end run" around the attachment statutes.

Under the constructive trust cases rationale, it was arguable that one could utilize a lis pendens in conjunction with a fraudulent transfer claim only after a Judgment for money damages was entered or, at a minimum, only after a Right to Attach Order was issued. At that point, the creditor had "proven" his case and was attempting to execute on specific real property. As a result, there were no due process issues and the specific property might have been at issue as a result of a frustrated attempt to levy on it.

After a creditor records a lis pendens, the debtor (or any other party or nonparty with an interest in the real property) may make a motion to expunge the lis pendens. C.C.P. §405.30. There is a two prong test to determine if the lis pendens will be expunged: 1) does the pleading contain a real property claim and, if so, 2) has the probable validity of the real property claim been established by the preponderance of the evidence? C.C.P. §405.31, 405.32. (A lis pendens may also be expunged in other situations not herein relevant.)

The Supreme Court in Kirkeby addressed only the first prong; namely whether the pleading of a fraudulent transfer of real property satisfied the "real property claim" requirement. A real property claim is defined in C.C.P. §405.4 as a cause of action ... "which would, if meritorious, affect (a) title to, or the right to possession of, specific real property ..."

The Kirkeby Appellate Court in trying to distinguish Hunting World observed that the Court in that case itself noted that the only cause of action therein was for fraudulent transfer (the money damages claim had been raised in a separate federal lawsuit). Citing Lewis, supra, the Kirkeby Appellate Court then stated that Hunting World "did not eliminate the necessity for a trial court to look at the underlying purpose of the complaint."

In overruling the Appellate Court, the Kirkeby Supreme Court focused on the "plain language" of the lis pendens statute, concluding it was clear on its face. The Supreme Court specifically held that the Appellate Court’s view that an inquiry was necessary into the "underlying purpose" (i.e., was there a real property claim or merely an attempt to tie up real property when the actual claim was for money damages) was not supported by the law. The Supreme Court clearly relied on, and came down on the side of, Hunting World.

In order to reach its conclusion that a fraudulent transfer of real property meets the real property claim requirement, the Supreme Court included as an apparently essential part of its holding, that the remedy sought, was, pursuant to Civil Code section 3439.07(a)(1), " the voiding of a transfer of title of specific real property." Therefore, as a result of Kirkeby, today the law is that where there is an actual transfer of real property and a fraudulent transfer is pled seeking avoidance of the transfer, the real property claim prong of the lis pendens statute is satisfied (even in the same suit for money damages.)

Of note, there are two things the Supreme Court did not do. First, it specifically distinguished and failed to overrule the constructive trust cases which it could easily have done given the remedies typically sought in those cases and the plain language of the statute. Secondly, it failed to include as an appropriate lis pendens situation the purchase of real property with the debtor’s funds while putting title in a name other than that of the debtor. This situation meets both the broad definition of "transfer" in the fraudulent transfer law (See, Cal. Civ. Code § 3439.01 (i)), and since a remedy might include the change in title of the property back to the debtor whose funds were used (rather than avoidance of the transfer as in Kirkeby), it also meets the "real property claim" prong of the lis pendens law by "affecting title."

Nonetheless, as far as it went, Kirkeby provides an important tool in the arsenal of the creditor’s attorney by permitting fraudulently transferred real property to be tied up before a Judgment or a Right to Attach Order is obtained.


Breakfast with the Experts, December 2004
by Edythe L. Bronston, Esq.
Law Offices of Edythe L. Bronston

On December 2, 2004, the Provisional and Post-Judgment Remedies Section of the Los Angeles County Bar Association hosted what has become a semi-annual event, wherein members and associate members of the Bar Association have an opportunity to interact with and question the judicial officers who preside in the Writs and Receivers and Attachment Departments. The December breakfast program was especially festive, as it was held in the 5th floor Salvatori Room of the Dorothy Chandler Pavilion. Against a blue sky backdrop Judges Dzintra Janavs and David P. Yaffe and Commissioners Bruce Mitchell and Victor Greenberg answered questions posed by Moderator Holly A. Hayes, a partner of Ivanjack & Lambirth LLP, many of which came directly from the 80 plus attendees. The program was sponsored by Mega Group Private Investigations, Inc., a Los Angeles-based firm with national and international operating capabilities. As some of the more relevant questions had slightly differing responses from the panelists, they will be addressed by topic

A. Ex Parte Hearings.
If Movants wish to have the Writs and Receivers Judges devote more than a nominal amount of time to an ex parte hearing, they are advised to come in on days when regularly noticed hearings are NOT held. In other words:
Dept.85(Judge Janavs) : even days for ex partes, odd days for regularly noticed motions.
Dept. 86 (Judge Yaffe): odd days for ex partes, even days for regularly noticed motions.

B. Orders.
It is extremely important that all of the remedies sought be set forth in both the Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order. Judge Janavs commented that it is very common to have the remedies listed in only one of the documents, which is in contravention of CRC 359 (c), which sets forth the form of an OSC and a TRO, and CRC 379, which sets forth in detail the explicit requirements for an ex parte application and order.

C. Evidence.
Business records cannot just recite the conclusory language of Evidence Code Section 1271; instead, there must be a description, upon personal knowledge, of the Declarant’s personal knowledge; i.e., exactly what comprises the steps taken "in the ordinary course of business" and exactly how it is that the Declarant knows of the specific steps taken in the particular circumstances. (Commissioner Greenberg)
All of the panelists ignore endless evidentiary objections, usually made by junior associates who, when specifically questioned, cannot articulate a good reason. They stressed that good, pertinent objections should not be buried in a sea of nonsense, where they will never be seen.

D. Bonds.
Counsel applying for appointment of a receiver must present an estimation, with evidence, of the rents or other income which will pass through the receivership estate. (Commissioner Mitchell)

E. Substance of Pleadings.
Judge Yaffe never reviews the facts set forth in Points and Authorities. He first reviews the proposed Order, then the declarations. He only looks at the Points and Authorities if there is a legal issue.
Judge Janavs first reviews the Complaint, then the Order, then the declarations.
Judge Janavs requests that she be sent a courtesy copy of all orders, so that she can make notes on her own copy.

F. Form of Pleadings.
Since bluebacks are no longer permitted, the judges suggested using tabs for pleadings, for the Court’s ease in separating the documents.

G. Filing.
The Los Angeles Superior Court has lost 600 employees under this year’s budget cuts. Although the Clerk’s office insists that all documents are being timely scanned, do not depend on your pleadings to have been timely delivered to the Department or, in fact, to have been delivered at all. Judges Janavs and Yaffe and Commissioner Mitchell still want counsel to file directly in their Departments (85, 86 and 59). Commissioners Mitchell and Greenberg strongly suggest that courtesy copies of the pleadings (be sure to stamp them "Courtesy Copy") always be delivered to Departments 59 and 66.

H. Commissioners Mitchell and Greenberg reported that Departments 59 and 66 were exchanging locations in the very near future.

The panelists all had pragmatic tips for the attendees, most of whom were overheard commenting that this program was exceptionally substantive. The breakfast was good, too! The PPJR Section expects to present the next "Breakfast With the Experts" in early summer.

[Edythe L. Bronston is a sole practitioner in Sherman Oaks, whose practice emphasizes all aspects of provisional remedies, especially receiverships. She has been a member of the Provisional & Post-Judgment Remedies section of the Los Angeles County Bar Association since 1984 and is a founding Director of the California Receivers Forum]



Most members of the Provisional and Post-Judgment Remedies Section are aware of the two best-known benefits of PPJR membership: Continuing education programs (normally at a discount for section members) and our periodic Newsletter. But many other "perks" are available to section members. Here is a quick recap:

PPJR section members may register for the section’s "listserv". This feature, available to members only, permits communication with the section’s membership at large on topics of interest. Call the L.A. County Bar’s Member Service Department at (213) 896-6560 to sign up.

The PPJR home page – – offers a wealth of resources, including information about upcoming programs; forms, documents and information available to section members; and links to other sites of interest. It is also easy to navigate from the PPJR page to LACBA pages containing information about numerous discounts and special programs available to LACBA members.

Members may access current case summaries in Daily EBriefs, and search for specific subjects using key words.

Issues of the section newsletter are available for review on the section home page.

The PPJR Section Executive Committee endeavors, throughout the year, to add new membership benefits, enhance existing ones, and to solicit input from section members concerning programs and services they would like to see offered. For more information about the Section and its activities, please contact membership chair Peter Bronson at